Endogenous Movement and Equilibrium Selection in Spatial Coordination Games

Authored by David Hagmann, Troy Tassier

Date Published: 2014-10

DOI: 10.1007/s10614-013-9398-3

Sponsors: No sponsors listed

Platforms: No platforms listed

Model Documentation: Other Narrative

Model Code URLs: Model code not found

Abstract

We study the effects of agent movement on equilibrium selection in network based spatial coordination games with Pareto dominant and risk dominant Nash equilibria. Our primary interest is in understanding how endogenous partner selection on networks influences equilibrium selection in games with multiple equilibria. We use agent based models and best response behaviors of agents to study our questions of interest. In general, we find that allowing agents to move and choose new game play partners greatly increases the probability of attaining the Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium in coordination games. We also find that agent diversity increases the ability of agents to attain larger payoffs on average.

Tags

movement Agent Based Modeling Coordination games Equilibrium selection