Modeling criminality: the impact of emotions, norms and interaction structures
Authored by Roger Waldeck
Date Published: 2016
DOI: 10.1007/s10588-015-9200-2
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Abstract
Criminal behavior has been explained in the literature by rational or
normative arguments. We propose a game theory framework of criminal
behavior integrating both concepts. Specifically the modeling includes
three factors, namely the gain from criminality, the adherence to a
legal norm and social pressure from criminal peers. We show that
criminality cannot be lower with increasing gain from criminality, lower
adherence to the legal norm or higher social pressure from criminal
peers. Finally, we observe by agent-based simulations that small local
interaction structures lead to spatial segregation in criminality in the
case where a polymorphic equilibrium is expected.
Tags
Cooperation
Segregation
Crime
Social norms
Deterrence
Maintenance
Altruistic punishment
Dynamic-models
Prospect-theory
Neuroeconomics