Effect of detailed information in the minority game: optimality of 2-day memory and enhanced effciency due to random exogenous data

Authored by V Sasidevan

Date Published: 2016

DOI: 10.1088/1742-5468/2016/07/073405

Sponsors: No sponsors listed

Platforms: No platforms listed

Model Documentation: Other Narrative

Model Code URLs: Model code not found

Abstract

In the minority game (MG), an odd number of heterogeneous and adaptive agents choose between two alternatives and those who end up on the minority side win. When the information available to the agents to make their choice is the identity of the minority side for the past m days, it is well-known that the emergent coordination among the agents is maximum when m similar to log2(N). The optimal memory-length thus increases with the system size. In this work we show that, in MG when the information available to the agents to make their choice is the strength of the minority side for the past m days, the optimal memory length for the agents is always two (m = 2) for large enough system sizes. The system is ineffcient for m = 1 and converges to random choice behaviour for m>2 for large N. Surprisingly, providing the agents with uniformly and randomly sampled m = 1 exogenous information results in an increase in coordination between them compared to the case of endogenous information with any value of m. This is in stark contrast to the conventional MG, where agent's coordination is invariant or gets worse with respect to such random exogenous information.

Tags

Cooperation Market Agents Strategy Adaptive competition Crowd-anticrowd theory Thermal-model Co-action