Effect of intermediate defense measures in voluntary vaccination games
Authored by Yoshiro Iwamura, Jun Tanimoto, Eriko Fukuda
Date Published: 2016
DOI: 10.1088/1742-5468/2016/09/093501
Sponsors:
Japanese Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS)
Platforms:
No platforms listed
Model Documentation:
Other Narrative
Mathematical description
Model Code URLs:
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Abstract
We build a model to reproduce the decision-making process of getting a
vaccination based on the evolutionary game theory dovetailed with the
SIR model for epidemic spreading. Unlike the two extreme options of
whether or not getting a vaccination leads to perfect immunity, we
consider whether `intermediate defense measures' including masking, gargling, and hand-washing lead to imperfect effects of preventing
infection. We consider introducing not only a `third strategy' as a
discrete intermediate measure but also a continuous strategy space
connecting the cases of getting and not getting a vaccination.
Interestingly, our evolutionary analysis suggests that the introduction
of intermediate measures makes no difference for the case of a
2-strategy system in which only either getting or not getting a
vaccination is allowed, even does not ameliorate, or say, gets worse to
prevent spreading a disease. This seems quite different from what was
observed in 2-player and 2-strategy (2 x 2) prisoner's dilemma (PD)
games with relatively stronger chicken-type dilemma than the stag-hunt
one in which the introduction of middle-course strategies significantly
enhances cooperation.
Tags
emergence
networks
Evolutionary game
Strategy