On the complexity of the El Farol Bar game: a sensitivity analysis
Authored by Shu-Heng Chen, Umberto Gostoli
Date Published: 2016
DOI: 10.1007/s12065-016-0138-1
Sponsors:
Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST)
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Abstract
In this paper, we carry out a sensitivity analysis for an agent-based
model of the use of public resources as manifested by the El Farol Bar
problem. An early study using the same model has shown that a
good-society equilibrium, characterized by both economic efficiency and
economic equality, can be achieved probabilistically by a von Neumann
network, and can be achieved surely with the presence of some agents
having social preferences, such as the inequity-averse preference or the
`keeping-up-with-the-Joneses' preference. In this study, we examine this
fundamental result by exploring the inherent complexity of the model;
specifically, we address the effect of the three key parameters related
to size, namely, the network size, the neighborhood size, and the memory
size. We find that social preferences still play an important role over
all the sizes considered. Nonetheless, it is also found that when
network size becomes large, the parameter, the bar capacity (the
attendance threshold), may also play a determining role.
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