Emergence of cooperation and a fair system optimum in road networks: A game-theoretic and agent-based modelling approach
Authored by Nadav Levy, Ido Klein, Eran Ben-Elia
Date Published: 2018
DOI: 10.1016/j.retrec.2017.09.010
Sponsors:
Israeli National Science Foundation
Platforms:
NetLogo
Model Documentation:
Other Narrative
Mathematical description
Model Code URLs:
Model code not found
Abstract
Cooperation is an emergent social state related to the dynamics and
complexity of road traffic and is reinforced through adaptive learning.
Game theory and research in behavioural economics provide ample evidence
that cooperation can efficiently solve social dilemmas similar to
traffic congestion in dynamic settings. Traffic theory, asserts User
Equilibrium, is both a stable and equitable, albeit inefficient, network
state, which is a behavioural outcome of the selfish uncoordinated
decision of drivers. In contrast, the System Optimum is an efficient
network state that minimizes the total travel costs but is hard to
maintain due to the inherent cost inequalities drivers will incur. In
this paper, we describe how the principles of game-theory in a simple
2-player game allow the emergence of a stable system optimum through
cooperation. We then investigate what happens in n-player games by
applying an agent-based route-choice model. The model shows how
reinforced learning and different behavioural specifications regarding
agents' cognition - selfish or cooperative - brings a simple road
network from User Equilibrium towards the system optimum while
preserving sufficient equity amongst drivers. The results suggest that a
sufficient number of route alternations between drivers and a certain
degree of altruism allow for a self-organizing formation of a fairness
equilibrium that can maintain the network in the system optimum. The
implications of future congestion management strategies that can be
implemented with information and communication technologies are
discussed.
Tags
Agent-based model
game theory
Cooperation
Congestion
social dilemmas
Altruism
Prisoners-dilemma
Prospect-theory
Traffic congestion
Route-choice behavior
Pre-trip information
Route-choice
User constraints
Fairness equilibrium
Traveler information-systems
Real-time
information
Stochastic
equilibrium