How European Union Membership Can Undermine the Rule of Law in Emerging Democracies
Authored by Jonathan B Slapin
Date Published: 2015
DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2014.996378
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Abstract
The European Union views the spread of economic prosperity and rule of
law to countries emerging from dictatorship as among its primary goals
when considering countries as candidates for membership. Existing
literature often suggests that EU membership confers significant
benefits on the accession countries, and these countries are willing to
undergo costly and difficult reforms to reap these benefits. Through
strict membership conditions, member states force accession countries to
commit to democracy. Drawing on theoretical work in the fields of law, politics, and economics, this article reassesses the conventional
wisdom. It argues that, under certain conditions, the reforms required
of would-be members could have the perverse effect of undermining the
establishment of legitimate law in transitional democracies. Using an
agent-based model, the article elucidates a theory in which placing laws
on the books around which no societal consensus exists can create
perverse incentives for citizens and government officials and may lead
to an erosion of the rule of law.
Tags
Social norms
Challenges
States
East-central-europe
Eu enlargement
Expressive law
Human-rights
Accession
Conditionality