Can honesty survive in a corrupt parliament?
Authored by Martins Jorge S Sa
Date Published: 2018
DOI: 10.1142/s0129183118500948
Sponsors:
Brazilian National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq)
Platforms:
No platforms listed
Model Documentation:
Other Narrative
Mathematical description
Model Code URLs:
Model code not found
Abstract
In this work, we study a simple model of social contagion that aims to
represent the dynamics of social influences among politicians in an
artificial corrupt parliament. We consider an agent-based model with
three distinct types of artificial individuals (deputies), namely honest
deputies, corrupt deputies and inflexible corrupt deputies. These last
agents are committed to corruption, and they never change their state.
The other two classes of agents are susceptible deputies, that can
change state due to social pressure of other agents. We analyze the
dynamic and stationary properties of the model as functions of the
frozen density of inflexible corrupt individuals and two other
parameters related to the strength of the social influences. We show
that the honest individuals can disappear in the steady state, and such
disappearance is related to an active-absorbing nonequilibrium phase
transition that appears to be in the directed percolation universality
class. We also determine the conditions leading to the survival of
honesty in the long-time evolution of the system, and the regions of
parameters for which the honest deputies can be the either the majority
or the minority in the artificial parliament.
Tags
Opinion dynamics
statistical physics
phase transitions
Computer simulations
Universality