Collective decision making by rational individuals
Authored by Richard P Mann
Date Published: 2018
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1811964115
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Mathematical description
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Abstract
The patterns and mechanisms of collective decision making in humans and
animals have attracted both empirical and theoretical attention. Of
particular interest has been the variety of social feedback rules and
the extent to which these behavioral rules can be explained and
predicted from theories of rational estimation and decision making.
However, models that aim to model the full range of social information
use have incorporated ad hoc departures from rational decision-making
theory to explain the apparent stochasticity and variability of
behavior. In this paper I develop a model of social information use and
collective decision making by fully rational agents that reveals how a
wide range of apparently stochastic social decision rules emerge from
fundamental information asymmetries both between individuals and between
the decision makers and the observer of those decisions. As well as
showing that rational decision making is consistent with empirical
observations of collective behavior, this model makes several testable
predictions about how individuals make decisions in groups and offers a
valuable perspective on how we view sources of variability in animal,
and human, behavior.
Tags
Agent-based model
Rational choice
collective behavior
information
utility
Animal groups
Rules
Social
information
Reality