A Networked N-Player Trust Game and Its Evolutionary Dynamics
                Authored by Manuel Chica, Raymond Chiong, Michael Kirley, Hisao Ishibuchi
                
                    Date Published: 2018
                
                
                    DOI: 10.1109/tevc.2017.2769081
                
                
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                    Model Documentation:
                    
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                        Mathematical description
                        
                
                
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                Abstract
                Trust and trustworthiness are of great importance in social and human
systems, especially when considering managerial and economic
decision-making. In this paper, we investigate the emergent dynamics of
an evolutionary game-theoretic model-the N-player evolutionary trust
game-consisting of three types of players: 1) an investor; 2) a trustee
who is trustworthy; and 3) a trustee who is untrustworthy. Here, we
limit the interactions between players to local neighborhoods defined by
a specific spatial topology or social network. Players are able to
adjust their game-playing strategies using an evolutionary update rule
based on the payoffs obtained by their neighbors. Through comprehensive
simulation experiments, we find that trust can be promoted when players
interact on a social network despite a substantial number of
untrustworthy individuals in the initial population. These results
differ from findings reported for an unstructured population of the same
game, where the existence of a single untrustworthy individual would
eliminate trust completely. We compare the dynamics of the model with
different social network densities and structures (e.g., from regular
lattices to scale-free and random networks). We observe that the levels
of trust vary under different network structures, and the level is
correlated with how ``difficult{''} the game is. When game conditions
are easy (i.e., low temptation to defect and/or almost no initial
untrustworthy trustees), homogeneous networks with higher densities can
promote higher levels of trust. However, when the game becomes harder,
heterogeneous social networks with lower densities are able to promote
higher levels of trust and global net wealth.
                
Tags
                
                    Social networks
                
                    Agent-based modeling
                
                    Cooperation
                
                    emergence
                
                    Trust
                
                    systems
                
                    Strategies
                
                    Evolutionary game theory (egt)
                
                    Scale-free (sf)
networks