Conformity in numbers-Does criticality in social responses exist?
                Authored by Katarzyna Sznajd-Weron, Piotr Nyczka, Katarzyna Byrka, Paul R Nail
                
                    Date Published: 2018
                
                
                    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0209620
                
                
                    Sponsors:
                    
                        National Science Centre of Poland
                        
                
                
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                    Model Documentation:
                    
                        Other Narrative
                        
                        Mathematical description
                        
                
                
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                Abstract
                Within this paper we explore the idea of a critical value representing
the proportion of majority members within a group that affects dramatic
changes in influence targets' conformity. We consider the threshold
q-voter model when the responses of the Willis-Nail model, a
well-established two-dimensional model of social response, are used as a
foundation. Specifically, we study a generalized threshold q-voter model
when all basic types of social response described by Willis-Nail model
are considered, i.e. conformity, anticonformity, independence, and
uniformity/congruence. These responses occur in our model with
complementary probabilities. We introduce independently two thresholds:
one needed for conformity, as well as a second one for anticonformity.
In the case of conformity, at least r individuals among q neighbors have
to share the same opinion in order to persuade a voter to follow
majority's opinion, whereas in the case of anticonformity, at least w
individuals among q neighbors have to share the same opinion in order to
influence voters to take an opinion that goes against that of their own
reference group. We solve the model on a complete graph and show that
the threshold for conformity significantly influences the results. For
example, there is a critical threshold for conformity above which the
system behaves as in the case of unanimity, i.e. displays continuous and
discontinuous phase transitions. On the other hand, the threshold for
anticonformity is almost irrelevant. We discuss our results from the
perspective of theories of social psychology, as well as the philosophy
of agent-based modeling.
                
Tags
                
                    Dynamics
                
                    systems
                
                    Model
                
                    Majority-rule
                
                    Independence