Negotiation for Time Optimization in Construction Projects with Competitive and Social Welfare Preferences
Authored by Jianguo Du, Qingfeng Meng, Zhen Li, Huimin Liu, Xiang Ding
Date Published: 2019
DOI: 10.1155/2019/3269025
Sponsors:
Chinese National Natural Science Foundation
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Model Documentation:
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Abstract
Construction time optimization is affected greatly by the negotiation
between owners and contractors, whose progress is dictated by their
desire to maximize system revenues. This paper builds an agent-based
model and designs an experimental scenario in which the contractor has
competitive and social welfare preferences relevant to the Chinese
context; we subdivide competitive preference into greed and jealousy
components and subdivide social welfare preference into generosity and
sympathy components. We analyze the impacts of these different
contractor preferences on the revenue-sharing coefficient, negotiation
success rate, and negotiation time when negotiation reaches agreement.
The results show that the jealousy component of competitive preference
has an important influence on improving the income of the subject, while
the greed component does not significantly enhance the revenue-sharing
coefficient. The sympathy component of social welfare preference does
not have an influence on the revenue-sharing coefficient no matter the
strength of the generosity component. Increasing the greed component of
competitive preference will lead to the extension of negotiation time
and, to a certain extent, to the reduction of the negotiation success
rate; the sympathy component of social welfare preference does not have
an influence on negotiation time no matter the strength of the
generosity preference.
Tags
Simulation
Uncertainty
Management
Fairness
Decision-Making
Model
Quality
Cost
Multiobjective optimization
Supply-chain performance