Publishing the donation list incompletely promotes the emergence of cooperation in public goods game
Authored by Qiao Chen, Tong Chen, Yongjie Wang
Date Published: 2017
DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2017.04.017
Sponsors:
Chinese National Natural Science Foundation
National Social Science Foundation of China
Platforms:
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Model Documentation:
Other Narrative
Mathematical description
Model Code URLs:
Model code not found
Abstract
Since the donation list contains a lot of information, the cooperation
may be promoted if the list can be skillfully applied. If the donation
list is published completely, it will be considered as moral coercion.
However, it is unfair to cooperators who contribute more money if
organizers do not publish the list. Thus, how to publish the donation
list properly is a subject worth studying. In our paper, we take
reputation, behavior diversity and face culture into account at the same
time to study the role of donation list in the public goods game. The
results of numerical simulations show that the effect of publishing the
list incompletely is better than that of publishing it completely or
keeping it secret. Furthermore, there exists an optimum threshold to
make the results best. And reasonable neighborhood relations are needed
to promote cooperation. In addition, some personal attributes, such as
the habit of data selection and mental capacity, have influences on
cooperation. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Tags
Complex networks
Evolution
Dynamics
Reputation
Network
Altruistic punishment
stability
gossip
public goods game
Populations
Indirect reciprocity
Agent-based
model
Behaviors
Donation list
Face