What if criminals optimize their choice? Optimal strategies to defend public goods

Authored by Camilla Bruni, Juan Carlos Nuno, Mario Primicerio

Date Published: 2013-02-15

DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2012.10.002

Sponsors: Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (MICINN)

Platforms: No platforms listed

Model Documentation: Other Narrative Mathematical description

Model Code URLs: Model code not found

Abstract

We investigate optimal strategies to defend valuable goods against the attacks of a thief. Given the value of the goods and the probability of success for the thief, we look for the strategy that assures the largest benefit to each player irrespective of the strategy of his opponent. Two complementary approaches are used: agent-based modeling and game theory. It is shown that the compromise between the value of the goods and the probability of success defines the mixed Nash equilibrium of the game, that is compared with the results of the agent-based simulations and discussed in terms of the system parameters. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Tags

game theory Agent-based modeling Mathematical model Computer simulations Criminality Mixed Nash equilibrium