When Do Groups Get It Right? - On the Epistemic Performance of Voting and Deliberation
Authored by Simon Scheller
Date Published: 2018
DOI: 10.12759/hsr.43.2018.1.89-109
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Abstract
This paper examines the claim that democratic decision making is
epistemically valuable. Focussing on communication and voting,
circumstances are identified under which groups are able to reliably
identify the `correct alternative.' Employing formal models from social
epistemology, group performance under varying conditions in a simple
epistemic task is scrutinized. Simulation results show that larger
majority requirements can favour the veto power of closed-minded
individuals, but can also increase precision in well-functioning groups.
Reasonable scepticism against other people's opinions can provide a
useful impediment to overly quick convergence onto a false consensus
when independent information acquisition is possible.
Tags
Agent-based modeling
democracy
Social epistemology
Group decision making
bounded confidence
Voting
deliberation
Rules
Cognitive labor
Division
Judgment