Selection of the distributional rule as an alternative tool to foster cooperation in a Public Good Game

Authored by Annarita Colasante

Date Published: 2017

DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2016.10.076

Sponsors: European Union

Platforms: No platforms listed

Model Documentation: Other Narrative

Model Code URLs: Model code not found

Abstract

This paper presents an investigation about cooperation in a Public Good Game using an Agent Based Model calibrated on experimental data. Starting from the experiment proposed in Colasante and Russo (2016), we analyze the dynamic of cooperation in a Public Good Game where agents receive an heterogeneous income and choose both the level of contribution and the distribution rule. The starting point is the calibration and the output validation of the model using the experimental results. Once tested the goodness of fit of the Agent Based Model, we run some policy experiment in order to verify how each distribution rule, i.e. equidistribution, proportional to contribution and progressive, affects the level of contribution in the simulated model. We find out that the share of cooperators decreases over time if we exogenously set the equidistribution rule. On the contrary, the share of cooperators converges to 100\% if we impose the progressive rule. Finally, the most interesting result refers to the effect of the progressive rule. We observe that, in the case of high inequality, this rule is not able to reduce the heterogeneity of income. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Tags

Agent-based models Social influence Cooperation Dynamics emergence Reciprocity Empirical Validation systems Prisoners-dilemma Public good game Conditional cooperation