Carbon allowance auction design of China's emissions trading scheme: A multi-agent-based approach

Authored by Ling Tang, Jiaqian Wu, Lean Yu, Qin Bao

Date Published: 2017

DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2016.11.041

Sponsors: Chinese National Natural Science Foundation

Platforms: No platforms listed

Model Documentation: Other Narrative Flow charts Mathematical description

Model Code URLs: Model code not found

Abstract

In this paper, a multi-agent-based ETS simulation model is proposed for carbon allowance auction design in China. In the proposed model, two main agents, i.e., the government (the ETS implementer) and the firms in different sectors (the ETS targets), are considered. Under the ETS policy, all agents make various decisions individually according to their own goals, and interact with each other through three main markets: the commodity market, the primary carbon auction market and the secondary carbon trading market. Different popular auction designs are introduced into the ETS formulation to offer helpful insights into China's ETS design. (1) Generally, the ETS would lead to positive effects on China's carbon mitigation and energy structure improvement, but a negative impact on economy. (2) As for auction forms, the uniform-price design is relatively moderate, while the discriminative-price design is quite aggressive in both economic damage and emissions reduction. (3) As for carbon price, the uniform-price auction might generate a slightly higher market clearing price than the discriminative-price auction, and the prices under two auction rules fluctuate about RMB 40 per metric ton. (4) As for carbon cap, the total allowances in the carbon auction market should be carefully set to well balance economic growth and mitigation effect.

Tags

Mechanism Reduction market power allocation pollution Impact Industry Cost Permits Multi-agent-based model Emissions trading scheme (ets) Carbon auction market Allowance allocation Emissions reduction General equilibrium-model