Paradox lost: Explaining and modeling seemingly random individual behavior in social dilemmas

Authored by Stephen Wendel, Joe Oppenheimer, Norman Frohlich

Date Published: 2011-04

DOI: 10.1177/0951629811398687

Sponsors: Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC)

Platforms: Repast

Model Documentation: Other Narrative Mathematical description

Model Code URLs: Model code not found

Abstract

Despite a large body of experimental data demonstrating consistent group outcomes in social dilemmas, a close look at individual behavior at the micro level reveals a more complicated story. From round to round, individual behavior appears to be almost random. Using a combination of formal deduction and agent-based simulations, we argue that any theory of individual choice that accounts for the observed behavior of real people is likely to require 1) premises of probabilistic choice, 2) preferences that are a function of others' previous behavior (i.e., context dependent), and 3) preferences that are other-regarding rather than simply self-interested. We present a model that fits the requirements.

Tags

Agent-based modeling social dilemmas rationality other-regarding preferences self-interest context-dependent preferences voluntary contribution mechanism