The cultural Red King effect
Authored by Cailin O'Connor
Date Published: 2017
DOI: 10.1080/0022250x.2017.1335723
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Abstract
Why do minority groups tend to be discriminated against when it comes to
situations of bargaining and resource division? In this article, I
explore an explanation for this disadvantage that appeals solely to the
dynamics of social interaction between minority and majority groups-the
cultural Red King effect (Bruner, 2017). As I show, in agent-based
models of bargaining between groups, the minority group will tend to get
less as a direct result of the fact that they frequently interact with
majority group members, while majority group members meet them only
rarely. This effect is strengthened by certain psychological
phenomenon-risk aversion and in-group preference-is robust on network
models, and is strengthened in cases where preexisting norms are
discriminatory. I will also discuss how this effect unifies previous
results on the impacts of institutional memory on bargaining between
groups.
Tags
game theory
Social dynamics
networks
discrimination
bargaining
evolutionary
Race
Gender
Inequity
Red king effect