Evolutionary ultimatum game on complex networks under incomplete information

Authored by Bo Xianyu, Jianmei Yang

Date Published: 2010-03-01

DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2009.11.026

Sponsors: Chinese National Natural Science Foundation

Platforms: No platforms listed

Model Documentation: Other Narrative Mathematical description

Model Code URLs: Model code not found

Abstract

This paper studies the evolutionary ultimatum game on networks when agents have incomplete information about the strategies of their neighborhood agents. Our model assumes that agents may initially display low fairness behavior, and therefore, may have to learn and develop their own strategies in this unknown environment. The Genetic Algorithm Learning Classifier System (GALCS) is used in the model as the agent strategy learning rule. Aside from the Watts-Strogatz (WS) small-world network and its variations, the present paper also extends the spatial ultimatum game to the Barabasi-Albert (BA) scale-free network, Simulation results show that the fairness level achieved is lower than in situations where agents have complete information about other agents' strategies. The research results display that fairness behavior will always emerge regardless of the distribution of the initial strategies. If the strategies are randomly distributed on the network, then the long-term agent fairness levels achieved are very close given unchanged learning parameters. Neighborhood size also has little effect on the fairness level attained. The simulation results also imply that WS small-world and BA scale-free networks have different effects on the spatial ultimatum game. In ultimatum game on networks with incomplete information, the WS small-world network and its variations favor the emergence of fairness behavior slightly more than the BA network where agents are heterogeneously structured. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Tags

Agent-based modeling Agent Learning Complex Network Incomplete information Ultimatum game