Strategies for resource exploitation

Authored by Markus Brede, Fabio Boschetti, David McDonald

Date Published: 2008-03

DOI: 10.1016/j.ecocom.2007.07.002

Sponsors: No sponsors listed

Platforms: No platforms listed

Model Documentation: Other Narrative Mathematical description

Model Code URLs: Model code not found

Abstract

In a mixed strategy, game-theoretical scenario mimicking the behaviour of fishing vessels competing for a limited renewable resource, agents following either a Collective Intelligence or a purely selfish strategy quickly outperform fully cooperative teams as well as agents not planning for future action by acting randomly. The stable balance between fully selfish agents and the Collective Intelligence depends subtly on the ratio of instantaneous demand to instantaneously available resource as well as on the dynamics of the resource itself. This suggests use of ratio of strategies as an indicator of the level of resource exploitation. The Collective Intelligence performance proves to be extremely robust to uncertain information, especially when longer records of historical catch are accounted for. Crown Copyright (C) 2007 Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Tags

Agent-based model Collective intelligence Evolutionary stable strategies Sustainable resource exploitation