Emergence and Collapse of the Norm of Resource Sharing Around Locally Abundant Resources
Authored by Shiro Horiuchi
Date Published: 2015
Sponsors:
Japanese Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS)
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Abstract
How do individuals resolve conflicts over resources? One way is to share
resources, which is possible between known individuals, with the use of
sanctions on free riders or by partner selection. Another way is for
anonymous individuals to respect the finders' ownership of resources
based on asymmetry and avoid conflicts over resources. This study
elucidates the conditions under which anonymous individuals share
resources with each other irrespective of their asymmetry with regard to
resources. High resource values inhibit anonymous individuals from
sharing resources; however, small cumulative values and local
distributions let anonymous individuals share the resources. Punishment
of the richest individuals also supports resource sharing. These
conditions may represent resource sharing among anonymous individuals in
periods of great disasters and may be the origin of the practice of
exchange in prehistoric times.
Tags
Social networks
Evolution
Cooperation
Trust
selection
Efficiency
Punishment
Indirect reciprocity
Private property
Doves