STILL CONVERGING? A DOWNSIAN PARTY SYSTEM WITHOUT POLLS

Authored by Emily Clough

Date Published: 2008-10

DOI: 10.1177/0951629808093776

Sponsors: No sponsors listed

Platforms: C++

Model Documentation: Other Narrative

Model Code URLs: http://www.psci.unt.edu/~eclough/stillconverging/

Abstract

This article compares convergence of political parties when voters are voting strategically and when they are voting sincerely under low-information conditions. In order to examine this problem, I create a computational model of a party system, where parties are uncertain about the distribution of the electorate. In one condition of the model, voters vote sincerely; in another, voters vote strategically. It is found that when voters vote strategically parties are less likely to converge than when voters vote sincerely.

Tags

Agent-based modeling median voter Downs information strategic voting