Evolution of contingent altruism when cooperation is expensive

Authored by RA Hammond

Date Published: 2006-05

DOI: 10.1016/j.tpb.2005.12.002

Sponsors: United States National Science Foundation (NSF)

Platforms: Java

Model Documentation: Other Narrative Mathematical description

Model Code URLs: Model code not found

Abstract

The ubiquity of cooperation has motivated a major research program over the last 50 years to discover ever more minimal conditions for the evolution of altruism. One important line of work is based oil favoritism toward those who appear to be close relatives. Another important line is based oil continuing interactions, whether between individuals (e.g., reciprocity) or between lines of descent in a viscous population. Here, We use an agent-based model to demonstrate a new mechanism that combines both lines of work to show when and how favoritism toward apparently similar others can evolve in the first place. The mechanism is the joint operation of viscosity and of tags (heritable, observable, and initially arbitrary characteristics), which serve as weak and potentially deceptive indicators of relatedness. Although tags are insufficient to support cooperation alone, we show that this joint mechanism vastly increases the range of environments in which contingent altruism can evolve in viscous populations. Even though our model is quite simple, the subtle dynamics underlying our results are not tractable using formal analytic tools (such as analysis of evolutionarily stable strategies), but are amenable to agent-based simulation. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Tags

Reciprocity Kin recognition Evolution of cooperation prisoner's dilemma Hamilton's rule armpit effect evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) viscous population