Protection and social order

Authored by Allen Wilhite

Date Published: 2006-12

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2004.07.010

Sponsors: United States National Science Foundation (NSF)

Platforms: No platforms listed

Model Documentation: Other Narrative Mathematical description

Model Code URLs: Model code not found

Abstract

Consider a simple world populated with two types of individuals, those who work and create wealth (peasants) and those who steal the property of others (bandits). With bandits about, peasants need to protect their output and can do so individually or collectively. Either way protection is costly; it consumes resources and interferes with an individual's ability to create wealth. This study investigates how individuals might make decisions in such circumstances, how those decisions evolve over time, and how broader societal characteristics can emerge from such decisions. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Tags

Agent-based modeling Club theory Computational Economics protection